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Abstract
Mitigation scenarios to limit global warming to 1.5 ◦C or less in 2100 often rely on large amounts of
carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which carry significant potential social, environmental, political and
economic risks. A precautionary approach to scenario creation is therefore indicated. This letter
presents the results of such a precautionary modelling exercise in which the models C-ROADS and
En-ROADS were used to generate a series of 1.5 ◦Cmitigation scenarios that apply increasingly
stringent constraints on the scale and type of CDR available. This allows us to explore the trade-offs
between near-term stringency of emission reductions and assumptions about future availability of
CDR. In particular, we find that regardless of CDR assumptions, near-term ambition increase
(‘ratcheting’) is required for any 1.5 ◦C pathway, making this letter timely for the facilitative, or
Talanoa, dialogue to be conducted by the UNFCCC in 2018. By highlighting the difference between
net and gross reduction rates, often obscured in scenarios, we find that mid-term gross CO2 emission
reduction rates in scenarios with CDR constraints increase to levels without historical precedence.
This in turn highlights, in addition to the need to substantially increase CO2 reduction rates, the need
to improve emission reductions for non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Further, scenarios in which all or part
of the CDR is implemented as non-permanent storage exhibit storage loss emissions, which partly
offset CDR, highlighting the importance of differentiating between net and gross CDR in scenarios.
We find in some scenarios storage loss trending to similar values as gross CDR, indicating that gross
CDR would have to be maintained simply to offset the storage losses of CO2 sequestered earlier,
without any additional net climate benefit.
1. Introduction
The parties to the United Nations Framework on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), by adopting the Paris
Agreement, articulated their desire ‘to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 ◦C above pre-industrial
levels.’ The Paris decision also acknowledged that
the mitigation ambition in Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) were insufficient to meet this
objective (paragraph 17, decision 1/CP.21) and estab-
lished a ‘ratcheting mechanism’ to increase ambition
over time (paras 20, 23, 24, 1/CP.21; Article 14 Paris
Agreement [1]).
This study explores emissions pathways to limit
warming to 1.5 ◦C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.
Thesepathways are all ‘ratcheting’ pathways in that they
take the emissions level implied by the NDCs as a start-
ing point, but increase, or ‘ratchet,’ this ambition level
to enable pathways leading to global temperatures in
2100of nomore than1.5 ◦Cabovepre-industrial levels,
regardless of whether there was an earlier temperature
overshoot. The central question for this study is how
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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the level of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) deployment
impacts near-term emission reduction requirements
for 1.5 ◦C-compliant pathways. The study aims to help
decision makers and the public navigate trade-offs
between the stringency of near-term emission reduc-
tion pathways and the scale of future deployment of
CDR by making the associated modeling assumptions
transparent. Since these trade-offswill inevitably neces-
sitate political and ethical decisions, it is the role of
scholarship to highlight, rather than decide, the vari-
ous climate mitigation choices and their implications.
In this context, we pay particular attention to the differ-
ence betweennet and grossCDR,with the former being
relevant to climate response and the latter being the rel-
evant metric for decision-making with regards to CDR
deployment. We are also attentive to the differences
between net and gross emission reduction rates, noting
that gross reductions better describe the required scale
of implementation of mitigation activities.
It is well-documented [2–6] that the majority
of published 1.5 ◦C-compliant mitigation scenarios
rely heavily on CDR—for example, the scenarios
examined in [2] include cumulative removal between
450GtCO2 and 1000GtCO2 by 2100. A larger port-
folio of CDR technologies has been proposed in the
literature, including afforestation, bioenergy with car-
bon capture and storage (BECCS), biochar, soil carbon
management, direct air capture (DAC) and enhanced
weathering (EW) [5, 7, 8]. However, scenarios tend to
emphasize BECCS [9], wherein carbon dioxide (CO2)
is removed from the atmosphere through photosyn-
thesis of bioenergy crops, which are then burned in
bioenergy power plants or converted to liquid fuels,
methane, or hydrogen for the transport sector [10],
with the CO2 emissions partially captured for geo-
logical storage. In scenarios, most of these removals
typically occur during the second half of the 21st cen-
tury, with annual total sequestration reaching as high
as 20GtCO2 yr
−1[2]. Within a given carbon budget,
moreCDRdeployment leads to less stringentnear-term
mitigation pathways. However, there are concerns that
BECCS, or other CDR approaches, will not be able to
deliver sequestration at the scales assumed—for exam-
ple if they are limited by technological feasibility, land
availability and competition with food crops, or stor-
age permanence [5, 11–20]. Thus, embarking now on
pathways with these relatively lenient near-term emis-
sion reductions that are conditional on the assumption
of large-scale future CDR deployment, could lead to
an irreversible breach of the pursued carbon bud-
get should this deployment prove unachievable. Some
scholars advocate for a precautionary approach toCDR
in mitigation scenario design: ‘the mitigation agenda
should proceed on the premise that [CDR] will not
work at scale’ [12], while others suggest a more moder-
ately precautionary approach that only considers CDR
approaches and deployment scales that are least vul-
nerable to the above-mentioned risks [17]. This letter
focusses on the relationship between levels of CDR
deployment on one hand and near-term stringency of
emission reductions on the other.
2. Methods
We used two different system-dynamics models,
C-ROADS (version 5.005) and En-ROADS (version
96) for this study. C-ROADS is a simple climate
model, consisting of a system of differential equations
representing the carbon cycle, budgets and stocks of
greenhouse gases (GHGs), radiative forcing and the
heat balance of the Earth, including the atmosphere,
land and ocean. C-ROADS closely replicates GHG
concentrations, global mean surface temperature, and
other climate metrics from 1850, and future climate
response projections of complex Earth systems models
as reported in the IPCC Assessment Reports [21, 22]
across a wide range of Representative Concentration
Pathways.
C-ROADS separately represents emissions of each
Kyoto Protocol GHGs (CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), and multiple
species of PFCs and HFCs), Montreal Protocol GHGs
(multiple species of CFCs), and short-lived sources
(aerosols andblack carbon).Themodel explicitly tracks
the fluxes and stocks of the long-lived, well-mixed
Kyoto Protocol GHGs and their resulting radiative
forcings. It takes the radiative forcings ofMontreal Pro-
tocol GHGs, short-lived sources, and natural forcings
(volcanic, solar, albedo, mineral dust) as exogenous
time series. Importantly, C-ROADS does not make
choices based on cost optimization (but instead on
user judgement) and so we were able to explore sce-
narios outside the constraints of economic parameters,
which is of particular usefulness for this study. Users
specify future emissions of the different GHGs for
each nation or region of the world. C-ROADS sup-
ports multiple levels of aggregation for the emissions
pathways, including 3, 6, 15 or 20 countries/regions.
C-ROADS enables users to develop any pathways for
GHG emissions so as to be able to explore a wide
range of scenarios. C-ROADS is designed to allow
rapid scenario generation; model results are available
within seconds, enabling rapid, real-time experimen-
tation and policy analysis. Limitations of C-ROADS
are discussed in supplementary text 7 available at
stacks.iop.org/ERL/0/064028/mmedia, section 5.
In contrast, the En-ROADS model embeds the
C-ROADS carbon cycle and climate system model in
an explicit model of the energy system and economy.
In En-ROADS, GHG emissions result from interac-
tions among population and economic growth, stocks
of and use of energy-producing and energy-consuming
capital (disaggregated by energy source and end use),
andenergyprices andpolicies.Themodeldisaggregates
the production, conversion and use of coal, oil, natu-
ral gas, nuclear, biomass, and renewables, each with
its own resource base, supply chain, processing and
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conversion into end-use energy. Energy consump-
tion for each end-use energy type is determined by
fuel-specific stocks of energy-consuming capital. The
model captures endogenous technical change (experi-
ence curves) that lower costs for each type of primary
energy. Users set policies that condition the develop-
ment of the energy system, including carbon prices,
taxes and subsidies, fuel mix standards, energy effi-
ciency programs, and others. Instead of assuming
perfect foresight and global optimization, key deci-
sions are modeled using well-tested decision rules
consistent with the principles of behavioral economics
[23–26]. Both C-ROADS and En-ROADS have been
developed byClimate Interactive,MIT Sloan, andVen-
tana Systems and are freely available (supplementary
texts 1, 7, 8).
We develop the scenarios here as follows. We first
use C-ROADS to achieve the given climate response—
warming of no more than 1.5 ◦C above preindustrial
levels in 2100—by varying GHG emissions and levels
of CDR. Next, En-ROADS policies and assumptions
are chosen to closely replicate the global emissions tra-
jectories obtained from the C-ROADS scenarios; this
step provides insight into the energy and climate poli-
cies and economic assumptions needed to achieve each
scenario’s global GHG emissions pathways. Here we
focus on the C-ROADS scenarios with only a brief
summary of En-ROADS results.
2.1. Scenario descriptions
We develop a reference scenario and three main 1.5 ◦C
scenarios using each model. Scenarios are designed to
result in expected warming in 2100 at a maximum
level of 1.5 ◦C above pre-industrial levels. The sce-
narios build from the emissions level implied by the
unconditional NDCs, which we assume will be fully
implemented. Further, we assume that the ratcheting
mechanisms of the Paris Agreement will lead to further
mitigation (‘ratcheting success’), including shifting the
target date of the current NDCs from 2030 to 2025,
early move from a trajectory consistent with NDC
implementation to a more ambitious trajectory, and
increasing the rate of GHG emission reduction after
implementation of the current NDCs. Finally, the sce-
nario assumptions differ regarding constraints we place
uponCDR: allCDR, has a full portfolio of CDRoptions
(supplementary text 7, section 3.6; [8, 21–25, 27, 28]);
limCDR (‘limited’ CDR), where CDR is limited to
reforestation and afforestation, while other approaches
are deferred until proven [17]; and noCDR, where no
additional CDR (besides the afforestation pledged in
China’s NDC) develops, following the suggestion of
[12]. Table 1 summarizes the main assumptions and
constraints used in the scenarios.
The noCDR scenario is a useful boundary case to
explore the level of near-term ambition necessary to
ensure that the carbon budget is not breached, even
if CDR is not forthcoming. Several recent studies sug-
gested that climate change might have already turned
some of the world’s forests from sinks to sources [30,
31]. The noCDR case highlights the possibility that
land-based CDRmay be severely restricted due to bio-
geochemical, technical, economic, social or political
constraints. However, generally some level of CDR is
consistent with a world in whichmitigation ambition is
increased substantially, even without dedicated human
intervention, e.g. through natural regeneration of for-
est ecosystems after halting deforestation [32]. Hence,
the question arises how much CDR can be conserva-
tively assumed to be implemented in a world serious
about mitigation. For the limCDR scenario, we follow
[17] who estimate a CDR potential that is screened for
social, environmental and technical risks, and compat-
ibility with the Sustainable Development Goals. Lastly,
as an additional boundary case it is useful to consider
near-term emission reduction in a scenario whereCDR
iswidelydeployed:TheallCDRscenario featuresa com-
prehensive CDR portfolio, with the maximum scale of
each CDR approach derived from the literature (sup-
plementary text 7, section 3.6). Near-term emission
reductions in this scenario can be understood as the
minimum level of ambition required to limit warm-
ing to 1.5 ◦C, under very optimistic assumptions with
regards to CDR. Note that because the potential and
risks of CDR technologies are poorly known today, the
allCDR scenario violates the precautionary principle as
advocated by [12, 17].
2.2. General approach
Our general approach to scenario creation in
C-ROADS begins with the NDCs communicated by
parties as of March 2018 and the maximum CDR
given the restrictions in each scenario described above.
Each of these initial scenarios led to warming above
1.5 ◦C in 2100, indicating that the full implementation
of the Paris commitments by all parties is not sufficient
to limit warming to 1.5 ◦C. We then implemented an
iterative process, applying increasingly stringent inter-
pretations of ‘ratchet success’ (increasing the ambition
of current NDCs and post-current-NDC reduction
rates) until the combination of ratchet success and
CDR constraint led to a 1.5 ◦C outcome (see table
1). Throughout this iterative process, the C-ROADS
model is run in its 20-region setup (supplementary
text 7, section 3.3.4) with NDC commitments and
ratcheting applied regionally. The level of ratcheting
success in these scenarios differs between the devel-
oped and developing countries. To reflect the different
stages of economic development across regions, and
consistent with the principle of ‘common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities’, assumed ‘ratchet success’
for developing nations involves earlier and deeper
reductions beyond current NDCs compared to devel-
oping countries. In the context of equitable effort
sharing, e.g. [33], developing countries would receive
support to implement these reductions. Note, how-
ever, that a full treatment of equity is beyond the
scope of the present study. Overall, our approach
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Table 1. Mitigation scenario assumptions and constraints.
allCDR limCDR noCDR
Prescribed climate
response
Nomore than 1.5 ◦C warming above pre-industrial levels in 2100, based on default C-ROADS settings
NDC and post-
current-NDC
ratcheting
success
∙ Developed countries…
achieve current NDCs in 2025 (for most this is 5 years earlier), USA achieves 150% of its 2025 NDC effort; after
2025, post-current-NDC reduction rate
∙ Developing countries…
achieve current NDCs; then follow
post-current-NDC reduction rate
follow trajectory toward target level and date in current NDCs until 2025;
then, follow post-current-NDC reduction rate
∙ post-current-NDC gross GHG emission reduction rate:
4% reduction p.a. after 2025 for
developed; 3.5% p.a. after 2030 for
developing countries
∙ 5.5% reduction p.a. after 2025 for
developed; 4.5% p.a. after 2025 for
developing countries
∙ 9% reduction p.a. after 2025 for
developed; 8.5% p.a. after 2025 for
developing countries
CDR constraints All CDR technologies deployed;
deployment rate and scale are
constrained to 50% of the maximum
values found in the literature (see
supplementary text 7, section 3.6)
CDR is limited to 21st century
removal from afforestation and
reforestation, activities are ramping up
from 2018 to 2050 and are explicitly
modelled based on the available land
area and sequestration along the aging
chain of forest (supplementary text 7);
no other CDR types are deployed
Afforestation pledges in NDCs (i.e.
China) are implemented; no further
CDR
Non-CO2 GHGs NDC reduction rates, and post-current-NDC reduction rates, applied to all GHGs (in CO2eq), with CO2eq ratio of
gases as in reference scenario, no reduction below minimum (floor) emissions levels of non-CO2 GHGs consistent
with SSP1–2.6 marker scenario (see supplementary text 2)
Other forcings Follow SSP2–2.6 marker scenario time series (exogenous data) for radiative forcings other than those of the
well-mixed GHGs (see supplementary text 3 for discussion)
GDP and
population
Population follows UN projections, medium variant (exogenous data) [29]; GDP is modelled using UN population
data and own GDP/capita projections, where near-term projections follow a curve fitted to historical data by region,
with convergence of all regions to 1% annual growth (see supplementary text 7, section 3.3). No feedback effects
between climate response, population and GDP are modelled (e.g. effects on population and/or GDP from adverse
climate impacts).
allows us to explore the minimum required near-term
and long-term ambition levels needed to keep 1.5 ◦C
within reach, given different potentials and constraints
on CDR.
2.3. CDR storage loss
In scenarios that deploy large amounts of CDR, stor-
age loss is an important modelling consideration,
since sequestration intonon-permanent storagemerely
delays, rather than avoids, climate change [34, 35]. We
follow IPCCAR5findings (table 6.15 of [35]) in assum-
ing permanence (i.e. no storage loss) for DAC, EW
and BECCS. For the other CDR approaches a frac-
tion of the storage pool that is accumulated is later
released back to the atmosphere. For biochar,wemodel
0.2% annual loss, based on a 80% long-term perma-
nence assumption [36]. For soil carbon management
the annual rate is 1%, for afforestation 2%; these fig-
ures follow modelling findings from [37]. Since the
uncertainty of these default values is high, a sensi-
tivity analysis was conducted (supplementary text 4).
Reducing modelled storage loss rates to half of default
values resulted in 0.04 ◦C and 0.03 ◦C less warming
in 2100 in limCDR and allCDR, respectively, while
doubling them added 0.05 ◦C to limCDR, and 0.04 ◦C
to allCDR.
3. Results
3.1. Ratchet success and CDR
If NDCs are implemented as communicated, total
greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 are estimated to
reach 56GtCO2eq [38]. To align with any of our
1.5 ◦C-compatible scenarios,near-termgreenhousegas
reductions that are additional to current NDCs are
required. Relative to the level of mitigation implied by
the NDCs, the allCDR, limCDR and noCDR scenar-
ios require 9.8, 17.1, and 24.0 GtCO2eq of additional
GHG reductions in 2030, respectively. In allCDR, near-
term ratcheting requires early or strengthened imple-
mentation of the NDCs for all developed countries,
while no ratcheting of current NDCs is required for
developing countries. After 2025 and 2030, developed
and developing countries reduce gross emissions at
a rate of 4% and 3.5% per year, respectively. The
allCDR scenario uses the least ambitious near-term
ratchet success, but is only 1.5 ◦C-consistent, if high
levels ofCDRdeployment are achieved.Thecumulative
21st century gross CDR in this scenario is 1046GtCO2,
matching the high end of the range of the 1.5 ◦C sce-
narios analyzed in [2]. CDR in this scenario utilizes a
full portfolio of approaches (figure 1, panel (d)); the
deployment scale of each approach is constrained to
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Historical emissions CO2 from energy and industry from LULUCF
Land-based CDR Other CDR CDR storage losses
Non-CO2 emissions Net CO2 emissions
Net GHG emissions Global mean temperature
CO2
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Direct air capture Enhanced weathering Total net CDR Storage losses
0 500 1,000 1,500
CO2 emissions budget, 2016-2100 (Gt CO2)
0 500 1,000 1,500 0 500 1,000 1,500
g. h. i.
CO2 emissions budget, 2016-2100 (Gt CO2) CO2 emissions budget, 2016-2100 (Gt CO2)
d. e. f.
C
ar
bo
n 
di
ox
id
e 
re
m
ov
al
 (G
t C
O
2)
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
15
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
1.61
1.42
1.74
1.41
1.68
1.43
G
lo
ba
l m
ea
n 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 a
no
m
al
y 
(°
C
)
c.
G
lo
ba
l G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
(G
t C
O
2-e
q)
-0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
-2
0
0
20
40
60
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
b.
Figure 1. Greenhouse gas emissions and removals, temperature response, CO2 emissions budgets. Panels (a)–(c) show global
greenhouse gas emissions and CDR for the 21st century as well as the warming response. ‘Land-based CDR’ includes BECCS, biochar,
soil carbon management and afforestation/reforestation; ‘other CDR’ includes DAC and enhanced weathering; (d)–(f) show storage
loss (red line), annual gross sequestration of CDR approaches (stacked coloured areas) and resultant total net CDR (black line); (g)–(i)
show the total gross CO2 emissions budget available in each scenario between 2016 and 2100; including the additional emissions
budget enabled through CDR (purple area).
half of the maximum potential in the literature (sup-
plementary text 7, section 3.6; [5, 7, 8, 27, 28, 39–57])
to reflect uncertainties and social, environmental,
technical, cost, and political risks associated with large
scale deployment. However, if near-term ratcheting
success only satisfied the minimum interpretation
applied here, these risks and barriers would have to
be overcome to implement CDR at this large scale to
keep 1.5 ◦C within reach.
In the limCDR scenario, CDR approaches that
have not yet been demonstrated as feasible at scale
are deferred until greater certainty has been estab-
lished, thus, only afforestation and reforestation are
included, resulting in significantly reduced sequestra-
tion. In the limCDR scenario, cumulative gross CDR
is only 573GtCO2 (342GtCO2 net), about half of the
allCDR scenario. This amount is well in the range of
other studies that take a more precautionary approach
toCDR[17] and is close to the total amountof removals
from reforestation (400GtCO2 net) in another recent
study [58], where the combination of different strin-
gent mitigation strategies, including life-style changes,
freed up agricultural land for reforestation and
eliminated the need for other CDR approaches.
The limCDR scenario’s CDR constraint necessitates
deeper near-term emission reductions to meet the
1.5 ◦C objective. Specifically, in addition to the early
implementation of developed country NDCs as above,
developing countries depart in 2025 from a trajectory
toward their current NDCs. After 2025, annual gross
GHG reduction rates are increased to 5.5% and 5%p.a.
for developed and developing countries, respectively.
Finally, in the noCDR scenario, all future CDR is
disallowed (except China’s existing NDC afforestation
pledge). As a result, further strengthening of near-term
emission reductions is required. The trajectory to 2025
remains identical to limCDR, but after 2025 steeper
gross emission reductions are required compared to
limCDR—at 9% and 8.5% p.a.
3.2. Temperature overshoot and peak
All three scenarios exhibit temperature overshoot,
where warming temporarily exceeds 1.5 ◦C and subse-
quently returns to lower levels. Table 1 shows the peak
temperature as well as the timing and length of a tem-
perature overshoot.Overshoot lasts 21, 38, and 45 years
for noCDR, limCDR, and allCDR respectively, sug-
gesting that scenarios that rely more heavily on CDR to
meet their temperature objective have higher peaks and
longer overshoot periods. Since overshoot scenarios
5
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involve insufficiently well understood risks (for exam-
ple with regards to the reversibility of impacts [59]),
variantsof thenoCDRand limCDRscenarioshavebeen
created that achieve the 1.5 ◦C warming limit with-
out overshoot. Unsurprisingly, these scenarios would
require deeper and earlier emission reductions and, in
the case of limCDR, earlier and faster ramp up of refor-
estation and afforestation efforts. Detailed results are
included as supplementary text 5.
3.3. CDR storage loss
CDR storage losses cause annual net sequestration to
fall after 2060 in both allCDR and limCDR scenarios.
This is a result of non-permanent storage being in the
allCDRportfolio and theonlyoption in limCDR.While
in both cases the net annual sequestration remains pos-
itive throughout the century, over time sequestration
and re-emission in the limCDR scenario will reach
parity, after which stage gross sequestration has to be
maintained simply to offset the re-emission of CO2
sequestered earlier, without any additional net climate
benefit. Explicitly considering storage loss in any miti-
gation scenario that relies heavily on CDR is important
since reporting only net values, the approach chosen
bymost studies, obscures the scale of CDR deployment
required for the scenario, and thus the magnitude of
the associated social, economic, political, and environ-
mental consequences.Whilenet valuesare important to
assess the response of the climate system, gross seques-
tration reflects the amount of CDR that needs to be
implemented to achieve these net values.
3.4. Net vs gross reduction rates; non-CO2 GHGs
and energy efficiency
It is instructive to compare net and gross reduction
rates for CO2 emissions. While the annual reduction
rates of our ratcheting success definitions apply to
all gross GHG emissions, net GHG reduction rates
are also highly sensitive to the relevant CDR con-
straints of a scenario. Table 2, rows 7–8, allows a
comparison of net and gross rates by showing aver-
age annual reductions for GHG emissions per decade
between 2020 and 2050. The net values reflect total
GHG emissions and removals, including land use,
forestry and CDR; while the gross values do not take
land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF), or
CDR removals into account. Gross values are always
lower, and in the case of the allCDR scenario, sub-
stantially lower than the net values. The disaggregation
allows us to present the ramp up of sequestration sepa-
rately fromgross emission reductions.Merely reporting
net emission reductions, on the other hand, would
obscure the level of emission reduction effort needed
to address gross emissions, even though gross emis-
sion reduction rates are the more relevant quantity
for economies and societies to plan their emission
reductions.
Likewise, disaggregation of overall GHG emission
reductions into different gases is useful. In the sce-
narios with CDR constraints (no CDR and limCDR),
ratcheting success in the immediate near-term (before
2030) leads to higher non-CO2 reduction rates
than in allCDR (table 2, row 9). For each of the
non-CO2 GHGs, a minimum emissions level is gen-
erally assumed to be unavoidable. For example, the
2.6Wm−2 scenarios in the SSP database [60–65],
assume a minimum of 4–8GtCO2eq yr
−1 in residual
non-CO2 emissions, while this figure remains simi-
lar at 2.5–7GtCO2eq yr
−1 in the recently quantified
1.9Wm−2 SSP scenarios, chiefly for agriculture [6].
Steep early reduction results in emission levels to reach
these floor levels quickly (table 2, rows 2–3), limit-
ing any further reduction potential for these gases.
To nonetheless achieve a given GHG reduction, CO2
reductions increase (see supplementary text 2). This
leads to improvement rates of CO2 intensity of GDP
that are historically unprecedented. Based on the his-
torical emissions and GDP data in C-ROADS [66–70],
global decadal averages for carbon intensity improve-
ments have historically never exceeded 2.7% (a value
reached only in the context of the Great Depression in
the 1930s), but have consistently been between 1.5%
and 2% since the mid-1970s. In contrast, the modelled
scenarios typically require rates well in excess of 5%.
3.5. Carbon budgets
Figure 1, panels g–i show the CO2 emissions budgets
for each scenario. These budgets take their scenario’s
non-CO2 emissions into account and therefore repre-
sent the amount of CO2 that can be emitted during the
2016–2100period in addition to thenon-CO2 GHGsof
the scenario while satisfying the 1.5 ◦Cobjective. These
budgets consist of an ‘inherent’ component, available
regardless of CDR, and an additional component that
reflects CO2 emissions that are re-sequestered through
CDR activities. Unsurprisingly, the total emissions
budget for the allCDR scenario is 2.5 times larger than
that of the noCDR scenario, due to the large amount
of CDR deployed. The difference in the net CO2 bud-
gets (CO2 that can be emitted without having to be
removed by CDR) across the scenarios is due to differ-
ent stringenciesof reductionsof non-CO2 GHGs.More
stringent non-CO2 reductions result in less warming
impact of non-CO2 GHGs, enabling higher cumulative
CO2 emissions under the same temperature objective.
The 404–483GtCO2 range is broadly in line with other
studies: For the same period, the IPCC’s AR5 reported
(adjusted for 2011–2015 emissions of 186GtCO2 [67])
budgets of 364 and214GtCO2 for 50%and66%proba-
bility of 1.5 ◦C.A recent SSP-based study reports a−175
to 475GtCO2 range for 1.5
◦C-compliant scenarios
[6], while an earlier study, again adjusted for 2011–
2015 emissions, reported 14–229GtCO2 [2]. Another
recent study suggests that budgets may be substan-
tially larger, at 730–880GtCO2 [71]. However, results
are not directly comparable due to several profound
methodological differences ([72, 73], supplement
of [6]).
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Table 2. Key scenario results, emissions and climate response from the C-ROADS model.
allCDR limCDR noCDR
1 Year net CO2 emissions become zero 2054 2052 2044
2 Year CH4 emissions reach emissions floor
[floor level in MtCO2eq yr
−1]
2055 [5177.9] 2041 [6117.2] 2030 [7286.7]
3 Year N2O emissions reach emissions floor
[floor level in MtCO2eq yr
−1]
2045 [2044.4] 2033 [2197.1] 2029 [2276.8]
4 Carbon budget, total cumulative net CO2 emissions
[cumulative gross CO2 emissions; cumulative net
CDR], in GtCO2, by period
2016–2050 893 [1092; 199] 797 [865; 68] 628 [633; 6]
2051–2100 −489 [195; 684] −314 [−40; 274] −170 [−159; 11]
2016–2100 404 [1287; 883] 483 [825; 342] 457 [474; 17]
5 Net CO2 [net Kyoto GHG] emissions in GtCO2 yr
−1
[GtCO2eq yr
−1], in year
2020 39.4 [52.7] 39.2 [52.4] 39.2 [52.4]
2025 37.0 [50.2] 38.3 [51.4] 38.6 [51.8]
2030 33.2 [46.1] 28.3 [38.9] 22.2 [32.0]
2050 4.1 [11.6] 0.9 [8.4] −3.0 [4.4]
2100 −13.9 [−8.4] −5.3 [0.2] −2.6 [2.8]
6 Average annual reduction for annual gross CO2
emissions by decade, in MtCO2 yr
−1 yr−1 [as
percentage of period begin]a
2020–2030 −66 [−0.2%] 690 [1.9%] 1296 [3.6%]
2030–2040 1063 [2.9%] 1201 [4.1%] 1648 [7.1%]
2040–2050 822 [3.1%] 811 [4.7%] 567 [8.4%]
7 Average annual reduction for annual gross GHG
emissions by decade, in MtCO2eq yr
−1 yr−1 [as
percentage of period begin]a
2020–2030 −26 [−0.1%] 953 [1.9%] 1639 [3.3%]
2030–2040 1408 [2.8%] 1421 [3.6%] 1795 [5.4%]
2040–2050 1011 [2.8%] 908 [3.5%] 662 [4.4%]
8 Average annual reduction for annual net GHG
emissions by decade, in MtCO2eq yr
−1 yr−1 [as
percentage of period begin]b
2020–2030 655 [1.2%] 1352 [2.6%] 2040 [3.9%]
2030–2040 2008 [4.4%] 1833 [4.7%] 2047 [6.4%]
2040–2050 1442 [5.5%] 1221 [5.9%] 718 [6.2%]
9 Average annual reduction rate for non-CO2 GHG
emissions, by decade
2020–2030 0.3% 2.0% 2.7%
2030–2040 2.8% 2.5% 1.8%
2040–2050 2.3% 1.3% 1.2%
10 Average annual improvement rate for CO2 intensity
of GDP in gross CO2/2010$, by decade
2020–2030 3.2% 5.2% 7.1%
2030–2040 5.7% 7.7% 13.9%
2040–2050 5.8% 8.2% —b
11 Average annual increase for annual gross CDR, in
MtCO2 yr
−1 yr−1, by decade
2020–2030 514 110 13
2030–2040 392 233 17
2040–2050 375 307 11
12 Gross annual CDR in GtCO2 yr
−1, in year 2020 0.0 0.0 0.0
2025 2.0 0.4 0.1
2030 5.2 1.1 0.1
2050 12.8 6.5 0.4
2100 17.2 9.5 0.4
13 Peak warming [peak year] 1.74 ◦C [2051] 1.68 ◦C [2049] 1.61 ◦C [2044]
14 Overshoot period 2033–2081 2033–2075 2034–2061
15 Warming in 2100 1.41 ◦C 1.43 ◦C 1.42 ◦C
16 Sea level rise in 2100 (relative to 2000) in mm 886 869 849
a The figure in brackets is calculated by dividing the first figure by the level of emissions at the beginning of the decade in question, to allow for
inter-decadal comparison, e.g. for the 2020–2030 decade:
((
𝐸2030 − 𝐸2020
)
∕10
)
∕𝐸2020. Negative values indicate emissions growth.
b Gross CO2 emissions reach zero in this scenario during this decade, making the average annual reduction rate (of an exponential decline
function) an inappropriate value to report.
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4. Discussion
Our analysis shows how 1.5 ◦C-compliant pathways
can be constructed using varying levels of CDR
constraints and correspondingly stringent ‘ratcheting
success’ emission reduction pathways. Ratcheting up
existing NDCs prior to their target date and further
strengthening ambition in the coming rounds of NDCs
emerges as an essential condition for 1.5 ◦C pathways.
Even when assuming large scale CDR deployment,
it was not possible to model a pathway where the
emissions up to 2030 follow current NDCs without
ratcheting. This is consistent with findings elsewhere
[33, 74–76]. The minimum definition of ratchet-
ing success, where developed countries meet their
NDC commitments on an accelerated timeline, and
all countries apply stringent reductions afterwards, fea-
tures annual reduction rates of gross emissions that
are broadly consistent with isolated historical experi-
ences of emission reductions [77–80], but, contrary
to historical precedence, these rates would have to
be sustained and would also require unprecedented
deployment of a full CDR portfolio at high levels.
These approaches are currently unproven at scale
and have considerable potential risks, as they may,
for example compete for land, energy, water and
financial resources.
As CDR technologies are increasingly ruled out
in the limCDR and noCDR scenarios, in accordance
with a precautionary approach, annual CO2 reduc-
tion and decarbonization rates reach magnitudes well
outside historical precedence and well outside what
is typically envisioned in emission reduction scenar-
ios that do not constrain CDR in such a manner [2,
81]. This points to the main trade-off between the
scale of CDR on one hand and stringency of GHG
reductions on the other: where societies choose to pro-
ceed with cautious assumptions about the scale and
availability of CDR, they will have to pursue rates
of GHG reductions well outside of what is currently
deemed achievable, based on historical experience and
standard modelling. On the other hand, embarking
on particular decarbonization pathways on optimistic
assumptions about CDR deployment would result in
exceeding the limits of the carbonbudget if the assumed
CDR fails to materialize.
As mentioned above, as part of this study we mod-
elled the same scenarios with the En-ROADSmodel to
explore their energy and climate policy implications.
A detailed discussion of the En-ROADS modelling
results is beyond the scope of the present letter, but
summary charts and an overview of the modeling
assumptions and results are included in supplemen-
tary text 6. In summary, it proved impossible to model
the noCDR scenario, without changing assumptions
about population growth or GDP projections. This is
broadly in line with a recent IAM study [58], which
examines how alternative mitigation options to those
of ‘default’ 1.5 ◦C mitigation strategies can lower the
need for CDR, and which finds that BECCS can only
be eliminated if all of their identified options (which
includes a lowpopulation growth assumption) are pur-
sued. In En-ROADS, most of the climate and energy
policy settings are identical for limCDR and allCDR,
despite the latter generally requiring less stringent mit-
igation. The main differences between both scenarios
are annual energy efficiency improvements (2–3 per-
centage point higher), and limCDR requiring a policy
which rapidly ramps up over the next 10 years to
require all newly-built stationary energy use (com-
mercial and residential building, and industry) to be
electric by 2028, in addition to transportation where
both scenarios require all new end use being elec-
tric by 2028. In the En-ROADS implementations of
the scenarios we find that the energy intensity of the
economy initially declines rapidly but then plateaus
at the assumed lower limit of energy intensity, before
increasing slightly in the last quarter of the century. The
increase arises primarily from rebound effects due to
low energy prices resulting from scale economies and
learning by doing for low-carbon energy technologies.
Consequently, total energy demand increasesmarkedly
during the same period as GDP continues to grow and
energy intensity slightly rebounds. In both limCDR
and allCDR, modern non-biomass renewables provide
the largest share of energy starting from the mid-2030s
and 2040s, respectively. In addition, once explicit sub-
sidies for renewables are phased out (in 2038, per the
scenario policy assumptions), and high carbon prices
make carbon-intensive energy sources unattractive,
nuclear energy experiences renewed growth. Nuclear
capacity grows five-fold between 2050 and 2100, at
annual growth rate of approximately 3%, substan-
tially lower than the rates observed in the 20th
century [82]. Nuclear (and non-biomass renewables)
play a larger role in limCDR compared to allCDR
due to the exclusion of BECCS, which limits bioen-
ergy utilization. Nuclear energy in these scenarios is
greater than in some other studies (see, for example
[83]), which assume that future social and political
preferences lead to lower nuclear deployment (see
supplementary text 6 for details); lower nuclear gener-
ation would require larger deployment of non-biomass
renewables.
5. Conclusion
Current NDCs are insufficient to limit end-of-century
warming to 1.5 ◦C, the aspirational objective of the
Paris Agreement, under any scenario explored here,
regardless of the level ofCDRassumed tobecomeavail-
able. This highlights the importance of theAgreement’s
‘ratcheting mechanism,’ in particular the facilitative, or
Talanoa, dialogue in 2018 and the request for parties
to submit new NDCs before 2020 (paragraphs 20, 23
and 24, 1/CP.21 respectively [1]). The analysis clearly
shows that ambitious ratcheting needs to apply to the
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current round of NDCs, and to lead to substantially
lower emissions in 2025 and 2030 than implied by
current NDCs—we found no scenario where 1.5 ◦C
remained within reach without significantly ratchet-
ing pre-2030 ambition. As such, the global stocktake,
another crucial component of the Paris Agreement’s
ratcheting mechanism, is not sufficient as a ratchet-
ing device, because its first instance will not take place
until 2023—too late to substantially impact ambition
in 2025.
While near-term ratcheting is a necessary con-
dition for keeping a 1.5 ◦C warming limit possible,
it is not sufficient; stringent mitigation ambition is
required throughout the 21st century. Importantly,
as policy-makers and societies make decisions about
which mitigation pathways to embark upon, deci-
sions need to be made with regards to the trade-offs
between near-term emission reduction efforts and
potential CDR deployment later in the century. In
this context, it is important to note that higher lev-
els of CDR deployment enable less stringent near term
emission reductions, but on the other hand commit
future societies to successful CDR implementation at
scale lest carbon budgets and temperature objectives
are breached, with profound implication for inter-
generational equity. Hence, precautionary approaches
suggest planning near-term mitigation under con-
servative estimates of future CDR deployment, to
minimize this risk.
Here, we highlighted three scenarios representing
threedifferent levels of constraints onCDRdeployment
to explore the resultant near- to mid-term emission
reduction requirements. Emission reduction rates in
the limCDR and noCDR cases are very steep, and,
in particular after exhausting currentmitigation poten-
tial of non-CO2 GHGs, reach levels well beyond
historical precedent.
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